Gender, Fear-Inspiring Beliefs and Church Attendance
|This gives us eight categories:||percentages of
the national sample
|M1. Male, high attendance, hell-believing||(7%)|
|M2. Male, high attendance, hell-disbelieving||(2%)|
|M3. Male, low attendance, hell-believing||(4%)|
|M4. Male, low attendance, hell-disbelieving||(30%)|
|F1. Female, high attendance, hell-believing||(10%)|
|F2. Female, high attendance, hell-disbelieving||(5%)|
|F3. Female, low attendance, hell-believing||(10%)|
|F4. Female, low attendance, hell-disbelieving||(30%)|
With the groups formed by these eight categories, we were in a position to look for differences in beliefs and values.To do this, the frequency of any selected value or belief for a group was compared with all seven other groups taken as a whole. In other words, how does this group compare with the rest? For the statistically inclined, the differences were tested for significance and only significant differences or those beyond 20% were adopted for the resultant profiles.
[We point out that so far as we know, this is a unique analysis of fear, gender and religiosity.This makes it relevant to sociology.The hope is that it will signal important issues for a modern church mission.]
Church Attendance: (defined as at least once a month)
Decreased slightly from 24% to 22% over the 15 years
Belief about God:
There is a personal God: steady at 35% to 36%
There is some sort of spirit or life-force: up from 36% in 1985, to 41% in 1998
How important is God in your life?
Very important: 1985,42% 1998, 45%
Oflittle or no importance: 38% 37%
How often do you think about the meaning and purpose of life?
Often: 1985 81%, 1989 86%, 1998 85%
The data show a credible stability of religious views in New Zealand, but also variations that can be seen as real social change. The main change is in the decline of the mainline, non-Catholic churches. Figures overall are relatively low, including the `Other Christian' which embraces both sects and Pentecostalist/Fundamentalist. The latter are thought by experts to have `plateaued'.
Replacements for the aging mainstream congregations are not easily seen. But the continued numbers experiencing great importance of God in life suggest a greater vitality than some would credit. The church may not be quite the helpless victim of implacable demographics that we sometimes proclaim. (However, see Ian Harris, 2002, in References).
This list then is of the main values and beliefs in the Values Study on which males differ significantly from females. The list is in order of strength of significance of differences between the genders.
Males, compared with females, were more likely to:
Males were less likely to:
Summary Male Profile as Compared with Female:
The religious belief items show consistently less presence of supernaturalistic belief on the part of males.There is a traditionalism in moral viewpoints and a relative intolerance toward deviation from traditional male identity. Accordingly there is less tolerance of the challenge toward male tradition on the part of the women's movement.
In the same vein, children are viewed in a more disciplinary way in the family but paradoxically are not so much to be encouraged to be respectful and tolerant of other people. Children are, however, to be obedient and hardworking, rather than divergent or independent. A recognizably practical approach of males to life as seen in technological development, money, consumption and sporting activities sits alongside an aversion to too much police surveillance.
(The items listed are at least 20% more likely in the hell-believers than the rest. The top seven in the list are more than 40% more likely in the hell-believers)
Hell-believers exceeded the rest in these beliefs and social values:
This is a highly otherworldly creed, as would be expected in a group who all believed in hell. Belief in hell is clearly, as suggested above, a strong indicator of a fundamentalist creed. What is somewhat surprising, given the high percentages of belief in hell among regular church-attenders, is the implication that `fundamental Christian beliefs' are predominant among attenders.
The essence of this creed is supernatural theism. With its code of morality, it is based upon the inborn-ness ofthe life after death and the immortality of the soul. Thus the euthanasia, abortion, prostitution proscriptions, which are seen as violating the principle of the sacredness of human life. The soul `exists' as a quasi-biological attribute on the same basis as any other "natural' attributes, independent of quality of life. People `have' a soul. Unlike other attributes, however, the soul is by nature immortal and thus is the guarantor of eternal value of the individual life. This quite logically makes preparation for eternity of paramount importance.
In the final analysis, for hell-believers, matters of earthly wellbeing or social values are secondary, expressing more the obligations en passage of those destined for higher things.An ultimate ethic for the world does not follow from this worldview. It is not surprising, therefore, that the world itself does not emerge in the responses listed above as having special significance for the hell-believers. This is not to say that the hell-believers do not share more common social values with other Christians. But those listed are the ones that differentiated.
Hell-belief is not necessarily accompanied by religion in the ordinary sense. Rather, the fact of believing in hell seems to lead to a near-fanaticism in all of life. This is logical if the object is the relief of distress about the unknown. Thus a person pursues an activity `religiously' as though hell awaited imperfection. The F3 female pattern discussed below is an example. The true fanatic is driven by religious rules every minute of the day.
The eight categories defined by gender, attendance and belief in hell are exhaustive, ie everyone in this New Zealand sample belongs in one of the categories.These allocations were easily determined from the data. An advantage of the data and the sample is that they are not confined to either religion per se or to a religious sample. The patterns are composed of New Zealand values and thus reflect religion-relevant value priorities of the eight groups within the NZ context. A texture of life emerges from within each style of religiosity.
The actual numbers in the eight categories were respectively 63, 10, 75, 258, 88, 43, 87, and 272. The 10 in the Pattern M2group is smaller than desired but not unusable.
Titles are offered for the patterns. The titles are interpretative but are not part of the data.
The following are descriptions of the original eight, re-ordered for gender, attendance and hell-belief. They are set out in pairs of male then female of the same pattern. Thus, Pattern M1 is Male, High-Attending, Hell-believer; Pattern F1 is the female equivalent. We start with the strong responses of the group to the survey questions.
PILGRIMS TO A BETTERWORLD
Summary: In one hundred randomly selected New Zealanders, seven will be males of the Pilgrims to a Better World pattern. This is a classical profile of supernaturalistic theism. It describes males absorbed by religion, defined as an all-embracing heavenly drama enacted by an all-powerful God, in which the metaphysical dimension dominates all `earthly life'. It depicts males relatively isolated within their family from the concerns of the environment and from their neighbourhood andsociety. Their faith appears to be about rescue from a world which God has rejected and will discard. More moderately, it identifies the `true believer'.
The Pilgrim Believer is individualistic in social relations, in the sense quoted from Wagar above: in a privatised religiosity with no necessary social vision - despite being strongly affiliated with the local congregation. This might seem to becontradicted by their high desire for a future society that places greater emphasis on family life, but this is not so much a concept of society as a desire for the family to be protected from surrounding society.
This group also, according to the data listed above, reports little reflection on the meaning of life, conceivably because the pilgrim pathway is more prescriptive than exploratory or intellectual.Women's roles are traditionally defined; the child's need for parents is dogma. It is also known from the data that this group sees instructing the child in religious faith as a prior responsibility of the family.In a world which is at best a place of preparation for the life to come, the family is the safe place for these males. It follows that the family will be highly protected; traditional family roles will be stressed and family life will be the certain provision for a better society.
Pattern M1 attracted more or less than sample proportions of the following demographic groups:
The demographics show that the Pilgrim pattern is Conservative-Evangelical by church affiliation, less `mainstream', more of marginal political preference, attractive to Pacific Islanders, of secure income level, and of parental age.
GOD'S SOCIAL HYGIENISTS
Summary: he formal belief position of the Pattern F1 Females, God's Social Hygienists, is the same as that of the M1 males. They are the largest group of religious females. Within a high congregational affiliation there is strong experiential comfort and religious identity. As with the males, there is limited reflection on the meaning of life. Again, there is agreement with the males on the centrality of the family and on a traditional woman's role.
The title God's Social Hygienists is suggested because this female group, while equally religious, is more concerned to clean up the whole of society. This is a clear gender effect. Though, in our opinion, individualistic, this conservative women's group seems strongly bound to an action role - much more so than the males. There is a strong moral purity emphasis, especially in anti-pornography, but also a greater `out-there' mission to put things right, eg with governmental price-controls, a de-emphasis on money in a future society and a resistance to unrestricted importation of overseas products to sell in New Zealand . These practical, political values appear along with a view that government's main responsibility is to maintain order in society rather than to respect the freedom of the individual. The familiar conservative distrust of individual human nature appears here. So their individualistic style embraces individual responsibility rather than individuality. It is responsibility, not rights that is stressed here.
As compared with the males of the same pattern, these women, by virtue of their gender, are active and micro-political, albeit generally conservative. The scenario that would follow would seem to be that of highly positive leadership at the congregational level by women, with clear ideas on how to order society better, while the men of equivalent religiosity are safeguarding their truth and their families.Both M1 and F1 will be energetic in opposition to all aspects of moral laxity.
Pattern F1 attracted more or less than sample proportions of the following demographic groups:
It is to be noted that women generally are more likely to be lower class and so these tend to be. In these demographics, these religiously conservative women are of somewhat more modest income level than the males; they are less affiliated to mainstream churches; the pattern is more attractive to younger adults and to Pacific Islanders and Asians.
CARING MALE PARTICIPANTS
Summary: This little group is one of two male patterns that fall into the Religious camp. The difference between the two is belief in hell. For these participatory males, hell is not a motivator; they affirm life; as non-believers in hell - and what goes with it - they are not biblical literalists. Nor are particular beliefs a prominent feature. Not preoccupied with otherworldly ideas nor with religion for its own sake, they are nevertheless strongly affiliated in attendance terms with the local church, though a thinking minority rather than a vocal proponent of causes. Rejecting hell as a worldview, they are participative in community. They have a contemplative rather than a doctrinal stance. They think often about the meaning of life and gain comfort and identity from their religion. Their concern is not with themselves but with appropriate conditions of existence for children and communities. Their thoughtfulness comes from a sense of being.
The main difference in values of the M2s compared with the F2 females (see below) lies in the concept of individual integrity. Whereas the M2 males assert respect for the freedom of the individual rather than maintaining order in society as the most important responsibility of society, the F2 females are more likely to assert the opposite: maintaining order in society is government's primary responsibility. Here the only difference is gender. It would suggest that the M2 males will be less assertive about cleaning up abuses by ill-controlled individuals, more likely to try to understand those being criticised or condemned, more forgiving of the wrongdoer.
The areas in which distinctive M2 viewpoints are to be seen seem to be those of children's right to parental care, community participation, and respect for free human self-expression.They seem to be organicists, respecting life in its complexity. Their world is closer to a garden than an empire. A war to force people to do right would be far from their way. Far from being isolated religionists, they feel emotionally close to their region. It is not, however, a thickly populated path.
Pattern M2 attracted more or less than sample proportions of the following demographic groups:
The M2s are older males, of modest means and committed to natural rights, be they communal, family or citizens'. They are politically marginal. Their demography does not explain their individuality other than to show that they are not part of the dominant power structure.
Summary: The seemingly unlikely combination of high church attendance and disbelief in hell, seen in Pattern M2 males above, when seen in females, takes on a somewhat different flavour, even while basically similar. To reject hell is to embrace life. Like the males, they are not literalists. Again, like the males, they value decent living standards for all, and are close to their social world. Also like the males is their community participation.
These women are additionally notable for their strengths as practical social and environmental problem-solvers. They emphasise protection of the environment, and greater government care for people-needs, as in pensions increases. However, as noted, they differ from their male counterparts in resisting respect for individual freedoms as a preferred government major responsibility over maintaining order in society. As if to reinforce this position, they demand more strict control of pornographic materials. Female gender expresses itself in a greater insistence on society `cleaning up its act' and less trust in individual freedoms.
There is, in this sense, a more controlling approach than in the M2 pattern, a belief you can clean up visible social sins. In gender terms, there is a more down-to-earth style that is emerging as characteristic of the women throughout this study. It's the economy of God in their view. It follows that the F2 group selects more projects than the M2 males: clean water, pollution, living standards, community activities. There might even be a female instinct for life here which reflects itself in a significantly greater, though not high, percent belief in life after death.
They feel strongly for their neighbourhood and town - perhaps not so widely as the Pattern 2 males. This caring is at the heart of their religion and imparts comfort, strength and identity. They are by no means affluent.
Pattern F2 attracted more or less than the sample proportions of the following demographic groups:
F2 females are of below-average means, more Mormon , more Pacific Islanders, and more of 60-plus years. Thus, compared with the M2 pattern, they do not display marked concern for individual human rights.
Summary: The non-attending, hell-believing male is dismissive of restrictions and is outwardly the egoic individual. The image, however, could be of one whose conscience is uneasy and who hopes for some after-life, limbo-type opportunity to face the music.There is little apparent sense of ultimate answerability or ethical principle.
The values which set them apart are those which support a self-indulgent individualism: resistance to resource regulations, to import controls and to controls over pornographic materials. That human relations are poorly practised is strongly suggested by lack of emotional closeness to the neighbourhood and dismissal of the importance of a child to a woman's fulfilment. Thus all dimensions of life are stressed by an insistence on an unhampered male right to exercise of initiative.
Despite these egoistic and consumerist values, the M3 male holds strongly to the fundamental belief that this life is not the end: heaven, the soul, and an after-life are strongly affirmed. So presumably, hell is just part of the package of a firm belief in the after-life.The contradiction is self-evident: if there is a hell and the possibility of heaven it would seem reasonable to judge one's life accordingly. If you believe in the soul, heaven and the life hereafter, the logical corollary would be a belief in hell. But mere belief in hell is not `salvific' as the theologian would say. The values expressed do little to indicate an impact of fear of hell. The conviction of judgement that goes with belief in hell is not evident. Presumably, there is a sort of indefinite postponement of reckoning. In the modern era, hell is a weak moral deterent.
Pattern M3 attracted more or less than the sample average of the following demographic groups:
Pattern M3 are ambitious working class, of Catholic and sect religious affiliation, socially marginalised and of parental age.
Summary: The F3 female group, low on religiosity but high on belief in hell, presents a protectionist stance, rejecting free importation of overseas goods for sale in New Zealand, and relatedly pushing for government controls on prices and for government responsibility for decent standards of living.There is a sense of deficit, driven by real material difficulty. Their attitude is somewhat arbitrary, as indicated by a lower than normal support for a democratic system of government. The position is that of New Zealand for real New Zealanders, with economic controls to ensure justice defined in those terms.
There is agreement with the dominant female F4 group on a pragmatic approach to the child's need for a parent, on importation restrictions, and on the relatively lower support for a democratic system of government. The F3 group lacks the strong environmental emphasis of the F4 group and also the active community participation.
It would seem that the F3 group is strong on demands for government provision for them and their kind but not equalitarian or fully inclusive. To return to the concept of distress about dangers of the unknown, it would seem that this group is threatened by the dominant power system and by inequality and wants guarantees of protection of its rights. Belief in hell is matched by extremely high belief in heaven, suggesting that it is a precarious group which needs alleviation of its fears, and assurances of providence, both here and hereafter. The whole picture suggests that fear of hell goes with hell on earth.
Whilst the male of the M3 low-religion/hell-belief group is a self-indulgent individualist, stressed by immature demands for power and gratification, the F3 female group is stressed by real and present threats to security, which it wants assured without necessarily obtaining equal citizen agreement.
Pattern F3 attracted more or less than the sample proportion on the following demographic groups:
The F3 pattern is a step lower social class than the M3 males, of lesser income levels, similarly sect-drawn, more clearly Maori and Pacific Islander, and similarly of parental age. Whilst the economic protectionism of the M3 males serves material aspirations, that of the F3 females serves needs for security.
Summary: As the dominant male profile, with verging on 30% of the national sample, this group represents the secular individualist half of the dual, male-female dominant national values-belief profile. The dominant male ideology is suggested by high agreement on two points: opposition to government price-controls, and decreased emphasis on money in future society. In other words, the dominant male pattern gives priority to wealth and growth.
As with each of the paired male-female patterns, the gender difference in the effect of M4 and F4 is apparent. The female F4 pattern appears as the economic and environmental guardians of the country. Both the male and female dominant patterns, together totalling 60% of the total, give low value to religious belief and religiosity. But the two patterns are not identical; they are complementary, a social equilibrium of male secular individualists and female secular communalists.
The male, M4 profile is that of a secular community of wealth-seekers and consumers. As true Post-Colonials, they have a shared religio-commercial belief system. They see a world of opportunity and minimal restraint. There is limited concern for the environment for its own sake. It is there to be exploited. Continuation of normal consumption is their idea of sustainability. A free-market philosophy prevails, eg no price-control interventions by government. There is a clear resistance to any de-emphasis on money-making as the raison d'etre of a society.
Religion, or reflection on meaning, plays little part in this dominant value-profile. The commission given to the early British missionaries to New Zealand was to advance good religion and the commercial advantage of Britain.Whilst there is now low belief in any life beyond this one and little apparent need for comfort from religion in day-to-day life, nevertheless the comfortable assumption of heritage and a commercial mission blessed by higher powers seems to hold. Our post-Colonial New Zealander is lord of all he surveys.
The male secular community, as epitomized in the recently-challenged `Men's Clubs', is complete in its secularity. It has its `theology' of true economic belief; it requires no outside authority to resolve its internal differences; it has its fellowship - the fellowship of profit in a sustainable society. That fellowship ordains the priorities that control life for the people. The power of organised business permeates education and society. It has a benign relationship with its surrounding area. Religion has been replaced by a system of practical beliefs and practices, the legitimacy of which is maintained by creating the myth that business is there for the good of the people - and that good people will conform to its requirements.
Belief in continued growth is so little debated that those who question it it are relegated to the ranks of political cranks, unrealistic academics or Luddites. This despite increasing disparities of wealth and the damage done by rampant economic growth to the natural environment. (See Webster, 2001a, pp35ff for Korten's devastating critique of `liberal right' economics. See especially the argument that orthodox economics is a form of slavery under the guise of liberation: behind the appearance of individual freedom in capitalist society, the individual is enslaved by the very system that promises freedom).
In classifying the dominant male pattern as the Post-Colonial Male, we are simply stating the obvious: making money and consuming goods have been and remain the prime national values (and are therefore the substitute for religion). Its temples are guarded by those who are devoted to belief in everlasting growth.
Sustainable community in the sense of social capital and social cohesion is a side-show of the real game of winning. It is in this sense that it is Post-Colonial: whereas in the original colonies, rational-technical decision-making was the sole ruling principle, decision-making now includes the `cultural factor' ie the changing values of diverse and shifting cultures. Culture, especially ethnic culture, is an unfortunate obstacle to sensible economics and the sooner people realise we are all in the same ball-game, the better for all concerned. <>This seems, according to our data, to be the traditional male-dominated society. But as has been suggested above, to argue that the male pattern is the New Zealand pattern is to overlook the female half and to fail to represent the complete modern reality. For it is not just ethnic culture which now questions the economic faith of our fathers: women are increasingly the carriers of a different voice. If equilibrium is the dynamic of the contrasting patterns, then the dominant female pattern becomes crucial.
The M4 male pattern is demographically middle class, tending political right, more financially secure than the rest, not of the religions that demand high commitment, and less likely to be non-European.
Pattern F4 attracted more or less than the sample proportions of the following demographic groups:
The F4 pattern is not attracted to minor political parties, nor to Conservative Evangelical churches. Few are on higher incomes, and are clearly lower than the F4 males. The group contains fewer Maori, Asians or older adults. Thus they are a secure set of mainly European women
Summary of F4: If the M4 world is Post-Colonial, the F4 world is that of Guardianship, standing to one side of the male pattern, asking the qualitative questions that unmitigated materialism ignores. So the female presents a major cultural factor. The dominant female group, at 30%, the Political-Environmental Guardians, stands in considerable contrast to the dominant male profile. At best it is the balancing factor. It is to be noted that the F4 group has lower wealth than the equivalent M4, which follows from the fact that F4 is the dominant female pattern in a still male-dominant society.
The most obvious qualitative gender differences were with the females' active environmental concern, their guardianship - in importation terms - of the economy as a resource for the people, their greater participation in community, and their independent spirit vis-à-vis democratic government. Their clear rejection of unrestricted importation of overseas goods onto the NZ market is a direct challenge to the male position on making money. While equally as secular as the male group, the females exhibit the cultural power of gender as an economic, environmental and community force. A secular spirituality, some might call it - but there is no basis in the data for that assertion..
The women evince a critical viewpoint in questioning the superiority of the democratic system of government. Democracy is not an absolute, it would seem. This female capacity for relativistic thought, as seen in their independence of male ideology, is a gender difference. It is widely recognised as a feature of female thought, as for example in moral judgement. Females are more flexible in the interests of humane solutions than are males, who stick more rigidly to the logic of what they believe to be universal truth - with disastrous consequences. So while males (even if not Americans!), are inclined to make `democracy' an automatic endorsement of private opinion, women know that democracy can be hollow. The phenomenon of fanatical belief in the hands of terrorists is not logically different from rigid political and economic orthodoxy wielded by powerful males in the West. It is to be noted that, at time of writing, women in trhe USA and in Britain and elsewhere are raising protest at the cruelty and power-obsession of men on all sides of the US-UN-Iraq-Islam imbroglio.
With these thoughts in mind, new attention may well be due to this dominant women's pattern of Political-Environmental Guardianship. Independent of religious dogma, and flexible in problem-solving, they arguably stand as a growing force in the future of New Zealand. Balance, or equilibrium in New Zealand life, could arise from increasing recognition of the complementarity of female and male voices and the greater involvement of women in the environment and the community. Petticoat government was once a term of disrespect. It is now being visibly reinstated, not as an inferior form but as a mature and essential corrective to destructive male gender monomania.
PLOTTING THE PATTERNS: the Individual-Community and Secular-Religious Nexus of the Combined Gender/Fear/Attendance Effects on Social Values
If the patterns that have emerged have integrity, they should be capable of broader interpretation. One way to attempt this is to plot the patterns against major lines of social differentiation. Two important continua on which social values fall are the individualistic-communalistic and the secular-religious. Using these as a two-dimensional plot looked like a good way to find some order among the eight patterns spelled out. To do so, the patterns must be able to be placed at one end or the other of the two continua. So a given pattern might be religious and individualistic. This is a simple approach. The more rigorous method is to measure each pattern on the respective dimensions and thus to have an exact position for it simultaneously on two dimensions. We chose the simple approach: each pattern was either religious or secular and either individualistic or communalistic.
Table 1presents an attempt at an interpretative map of the territory of the patterns, intersecting the Secular-Religious dimension based on attendance with the Individualistic-Communalistic distinction that emerges from the descriptions of the social values of the eight patterns. These two dimensions provide the resultant plot of the eight patterns.
It emerges immediately that three of the four female patterns are in one way or another communally oriented, while only one male pattern is so. Countering this, three out of four male patterns are individualistic while only one is communalistic. Male and female patterns each fall two into religious and two into secular quadrants.
As would be expected from known attendance data, the largest patterns numerically for both sexes are secular. Indeed the total percentages in the two secular quadrants make up 74% of the total. Again, it is more important that the major male pattern is Secular-Individualistic, while that of the female patterns is Secular-Communalistic.
If the position were taken that the mission of the church must be to the Secular, then it is clearly a daunting task - not unlike sending missionaries to Baghdad! More seriously, it might be recognised that even though the great blocs of secular value-patterns demand their own mission, it remains the case, as in political vote-getting, that the most volatile groups are around the edges. What has been achieved in this study is to identify the major gender-based blocs and to differentiate the marginal patterns, both religious and secular.
The marginal patterns (religious) are:
The marginal patterns (secular) are:
These patterns, along with the two major blocs,
The six marginal patterns represent the volatile challenge to church mission. The two great secular blocs conceivably represent the call for a prophetic ministry.
The earlier differentiations, based on single effects of attendance, gender and fear-inspiring belief are important information by which to flesh out the meaning of the patterns and the details by which church mission may be informed. An example of its importance is in the variety of ways in which dogma about hell underlie a number of the patterns and help re-emphasise the lesser social vision in the public arena among conservative evangelicals noted from David Martin.(rf p1)
In broader sociological terms, there is ample evidence that the two religious factors, attendance and fear, taken in combination with each other and with gender, identify differences between patterns of social values and beliefs. The values data make a significant contribution to understanding of the effects of gender and of fear-inspiring beliefs, just as the existential factors of real conditions of life bear upon and help explain the variety of human values.
34%M3: Male, Low-Attending, Hell-Believing (4%)
M4: Male Low-Attending, Hell-Disbelieving (30%)
17%M1: Male, High-Attending, Hell-Believing (7%)
PILGRIMS TO A BETTER WORLD
F1: Female, High-Attending, Hell-Believing (10%)
M3: Male, Low-Attending, Hell-Believing (4%)
M4: Male Low-Attending, Hell-Disbelieving (30%)
M1: Male, High-Attending, Hell-Believing (7%)
PILGRIMS TO A BETTER WORLD
F1: Female, High-Attending, Hell-Believing (10%)
Ian Harris, "Beware the invasion of the no religionists", ReSEARCH, Bulletin of Christian Research Association (Aotearoa New Zealand). Bulletin No 38, Summer Issue, 2002-12-29
Grace Jantzen, "Feminism and flourishing", Feminist Theology, No 10, 1995
Nietsche, Friedrich, Twilight of the Idols, p62, (Penguin, 1990).
Quoted in Mark Buchanan, Ubiquity: the science of history.or why the world is simpler than we think. London: Phoenix, 2000.
Alan Webster and Paul Perry (1992), What difference does it make? Values and faith in a changing society. Palmerston North, Alpha Publications
Alan Webster, (2001a) Spiral of values: the flow from survival values to global consciousness in New Zealand. Alpha, Auckland. Distributed by David Bateman, Publishers, Auckland, North Shore.
Alan Webster (2001b), Fear-inspiring beliefs and personal religion, reSEARCH, Bulletin of the Christian Research Association (Aotearoa New Zealand). Bulletin No 33, Winter Issue, 2001